The concept of refinement in type theory is a way of reconciling the "intrinsic" and the "extrinsic" meanings of types. We begin with a rigorous analysis of this concept, settling on the simple conclusion that the type-theoretic notion of "type refinement system" may be identified with the category-theoretic notion of "functor". We then use this correspondence to give an equivalent type-theoretic formulation of Grothendieck's definition of (bi)fibration, and extend this to a definition of monoidal closed bifibrations, which we see as a natural space in which to study the properties of proofs and programs. Our main result is a representation theorem for strong monads on a monoidal closed fibration, describing sufficient conditions for a monad to be isomorphic to a continuations monad "up to pullback".
Introduction
One of the difficulties in giving a clear mathematical definition of the "topic" of type theory is that the word "type" is actually used with two very different intuitive meanings and technical purposes in mind:
1. Like the syntactician's parts of speech, as a way of defining the grammar of well-formed expressions.
2. Like the semanticist's predicates, as a way of identifying subsets of expressions with certain desirable properties.
These two different views of types are often associated respectively with Alonzo Church and Haskell Curry (hence "typesà la Church" and "typesà la Curry"), while the late John Reynolds referred to these as the intrinsic and the extrinsic interpretations of types [11] . In the intrinsic view, all expressions carry a type, and there is no need (or even sense) to consider the meaning of "untyped" expressions; while in the extrinsic view, every expression carries an independent meaning, and typing judgments serve to assert some property of that meaning. Usually, readings of type theory through the lens of category theory have sided towards the intrinsic view. This is natural given the analogy type system ∼ category which says for example that a judgment x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n ⊢ e : B of the simply-typed lambda calculus may be interpreted as a morphism
in a cartesian-closed category [6] . This favors the intrinsic interpretation, since any morphism of a category
is intrinsically associated with a pair of types (or "objects"), namely, its domain dom( f ) = A and codomain cod( f ) = B. Nor is it considered sensible to write the same morphism between a different pair of objects, between the same pair of objects.
But while the identification of typing judgments with morphisms of a category works nicely for systems like the simply-typed lambda calculus, for better or worse, the extrinsic view of types is also an important aspect of type theory, and does not seem to sit well with this analogy. For instance, certain basic typetheoretic notions such as intersection types and subtyping really call out for an extrinsic reading. Typically, the most natural and direct reading of the intersection introduction rule Γ ⊢ e : A Γ ⊢ e : B Γ ⊢ e : A ∩ B makes different typing judgments about the same expression, as does the most natural reading of the subsumption rule Γ ⊢ e : A A ≤ B Γ ⊢ e : B
Trying to give an intrinsic interpretation of these rules instead (e.g., by asserting the existence of "hidden coercions") requires mental gymnastics. Indeed, the very idea of a typing judgment in some sense presupposes a domain of expressions which may be judged. Per Martin-Löf gave an influential dissection of the concept of judgment in logic [9] , and in many ways his theory of dependent types is all about the interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic interpretations. This is to say that the mismatch between categories and type systems cannot be dismissed as a mere artifact of notation-instead it reveals that something is conceptually missing in the standard categorical reading of type theory.
Type refinement systems, fibrations and bifibrations
We want to offer a different reading, and our starting point will be a categorical analysis of the concept of refinement in type theory, which is a way of reconciling the intrinsic and the extrinsic meanings of types [4, 10] . The basic idea of refinement is simple: a "typeà la Curry" should not be considered as a predicate in a vacuum, but really as a predicate over a given "typeà la Church". In the limiting case, perhaps, there is a unique underlying "intrinsic type" which all of the different "extrinsic types" refine, but most often one's world is more diverse, and it is helpful to keep this in mind.
Our main aim in this section is to explain how the analogy type system ∼ category may be generalized to an analogy type refinement system ∼ functor and to then use this analogy to give an equivalent type-theoretic reformulation of Grothendieck's definition of fibration and bifibration.
Reading a functor as a type refinement system
Let us suppose given two categories I and E, related by a functor p : E → I. We establish a few terminological and notational conventions. We refer to the objects of I as i-types A, B, . . . , and to its morphisms as expressions f, g, . . . . We indicate the signature of an expression in the traditional categorical style by writing the expression above an arrow from its domain to its codomain,
or else using the type-theoretic colon notation f : A → B. Expressions are composed in diagrammatic order, i.e., we write the composition of 
−→ C
We indicate the identity morphism on an i-type A as the expression − A , or often simply "−" when the i-type is clear from context.
We refer to the objects of E as e-types S, T, . . . and to its morphisms as derivations α, β, . . . . Otherwise, we keep the same notational conventions for e-types and derivations as for i-types and expressions, writing the composition of Now, suppose given an expression f : A → B and two e-types S ⊏ A and T ⊏ B. Such a triple of information is called a typing judgment, which we notate by writing f below an arrow from S to T:
In the special case where A = B and f = − A , we use the abbreviated notation
which we call a subtyping judgment.
Definition 2.2. A typing derivation for a (sub)typing judgment S
We notate this concisely by placing α over the judgment: 
We will adapt the standard conventions of proof theory in using inference rules as a compact notation for generating typing derivations. Somewhat informally, we say that an inference rule
is admissible if there is an operation D for transforming derivations of the premises
We will often also label an admissible rule with the corresponding operation on derivations, as an annotation to the side of the horizontal line:
For example, composition and identity typing rules are admissible:
In particular, the operation C is defined by C(α, β) = (α; β), while I is defined by I = − S ; the fact that these rules are admissible is immediate from the assumption that p : E → I is a functor. Likewise, reflexivity, transitivity, and subsumption rules for subtyping are admissible,
noting that reflexivity is by definition just another way of writing the identity typing rule I, and that transitivity and subsumption are all special cases of C with one or both of f and g set to −.
Since I is a category, there is a notion of identity of expressions, which we notate f ∼ g. We allow ourselves to treat typing judgments modulo identity of expressions, so that Since E is also a category, there is likewise a notion of equality of derivations. However, we won't typically refer to equality between "naked" derivations, but only between derivations of particular typing judgments. For example, the associativity and unit equations of E imply the following equations betwen derivations of typing judgments:
Finally, besides the usual notion of isomorphism of objects of E, we can consider a stronger notion of "vertical" isomorphism of e-types. 
In the sequel, whenever we say that two e-types are isomorphic, we really mean vertical isomorphism. Now let us take a moment to reflect. Of course, everything we have said so far is completely trivial, a mere matter of changing some of the standard categorical terminology and establishing some syntactic conventions. We hope the point that comes across, though, is that a lot of type-theoretic commentary can be extracted from the mere existence of a functor (if we only know where to look for the hidden soundtrack!). In particular, these observations motivate our adopting the following simple definition.
Definition 2.4.
A type refinement system is just a functor p : E → I.
A typical example
To try to provide a bit of intuition for this funny way of reading functors, we will consider a simple and naive example, which is indeed perhaps the "folk model" for type refinement systems. For I we take the category of sets and functions Set, while for E we take the category of subsets and image inclusions SubSet. An object of SubSet is just a subset of a given underlying set
is a function between the underlying sets f : A → B such that the image of the first subset is included in the second
As the functor p : SubSet → Set, we take the forgetful map sending a subset S ⊆ A to its underlying set A, and a function f : A → B to itself (simply forgetting the fact that f (S) ⊆ T). By most interpretations, this model is already quite rich with i-types. For example we might suppose it contains i-types of the natural numbers, integers, sequences of integers, N, Z, Z N and many more besides. But the philosophy of type refinement is that rather than trying to translate every detail of the world into the language of I (which is perhaps the traditional view of set-theoretic foundations), it is sometimes better to begin with a rough statement in I, then provide additional explanation in E. Thus, for instance, we might consider the e-types of odd natural numbers or of prime natural numbers,
the e-types of non-zero integers or of non-negative integers,
the e-types of linear sequences or of bounded sequences,
and so on. The point is that these e-types will always be considered with respect to the original i-types which they refine. For example, the question whether "every prime number is odd" may be sensibly posed as a subtyping problem, {n | n prime} −→ {n | ∃k.n = 2k + 1} whose answer happens to be negative (i.e., the judgment is not derivable). On the other hand, the question of whether "every linear sequence is prime" is not really sensible without resort to arbitrary conventions or encodings, and the corresponding subtyping judgment
is not well-formed, since the two e-types refine different i-types. As another example, if we take
to be the squaring function on the integers, then the following three typing judgments are respectively derivable, underivable, and ill-formed:
Reading Grothendieck in translation
Let us recall the definition of when a functor p : E → I defines a fibrationà la Grothendieck.
Definition 2.5. A morphism α : T ′ → T in E is said to be (p−)cartesian if for every object S ∈ E and every pair of morphisms β : S → T and g
: p(S) → p(T ′ ) such that p(β) = g; p(α), there is a unique morphism β ′ : S → T ′ such that β = α; β ′ and p(β ′ ) = g. Let f : A → B
be a morphism in I and T be an object of E such that p(T) = B. A morphism α in E is said to be a cartesian lifting of f to T if p(α) = f , cod(α) = T, and α is cartesian.

Definition 2.6. A functor p : E → I is said to be a fibration if for every morphism f : A → B in I and object T ∈ E such that p(T) = B, f has a cartesian lifting to T.
This definition may seem a bit mysterious to the uninitiated. Rather than attempting to motivate it directly, we will now give an equivalent formulation in the language of type refinement. Again, we assume a fixed functor p : E → I and the notational and terminological conventions of Section 2.1.
Definition 2.7. Let f : A → B and T ⊏ B. A (p-)pullback of T along f is an e-type f
* T ⊏ A equipped with a pair of admissible rules
referred to as the left rule and the right rule, such that for all derivations
we have equalities
Proposition 2.8. Any two pullbacks of T along f are isomorphic.
Proof. Let T ′ and T ′′ both be pullbacks of T along f , equipped with corresponding admissible rules
and likewise (by a symmetric argument)
we have T ′ ∼ T ′′ (and so we may speak of the pullback f * T when one exists).
Proposition 2.9. Whenever both sides exist, ( f ; g)
and again by an easy calculation, we can show that these two derivations compose to the identity.
We write out these explicit proofs in order to demonstrate a certain style of argument (similar to reasoning in sequent calculus), but of course these properties of pullbacks are well-known. Indeed, as the following proposition asserts, we have just dressed up Grothendieck's definition of cartesian liftings in type-theoretic notation.
Proposition 2.10. α : T ′ → T is a cartesian lifting of f to T if and only if T ′ is a pullback of f along T, with the left rule given by α, and the right rule defined by the universal property of α.
Proof. Essentially immediate by unwinding the definitions.
We can use this correspondence to restate the definition of when a functor is a fibration. 
One can also describe the pullback and pushforward in pointwise form,
where the formula for the pushforward denotes a coend. 
while pullbacks correspond to the calculation of weakest preconditions and pushforwards to strongest postconditions.
Weighted intersections and unions
Although we will not explore this further here, we remark that pullbacks and pushforwards could also be seen as instances of a more general notion of "weighted" intersection and union types. 
such that for all collections of derivations
we have ∀i ∈ I.
Dually, let ( f i : A i → B) i∈I be a collection of expressions and (S i ⊏ A i ) i∈I a collection of e-types. The ( f i )-weighted union of the (S i ) is an e-type i∈I f i S i ⊏ B equipped with a collection of admissible rules
as well as an admissible rule ∀i ∈ I. S i −→
such that for all collections of derivations 
i∈I f i S i ⊏ B Pullbacks and pushforwards of course correspond to the weighted intersection/union of a singleton, while the usual "unweighted" notion of intersection and union can be seen as weighting by the identity. For example, with the definitions
the following type formation and typing rules are admissible in any bicomplete type refinement system:
Weighted intersections and unions in their full generality may be seen as an abstraction of the programming concepts of variant record and tagged union.
Monoidal type refinement systems
So far we have assumed nothing about the base category of i-types, other than that it is a category. In this interlude we consider refinement of monoidal categories of i-types, with a corresponding monoidal structure on e-types. (In the next section, we will consider refinement of monoidal closed categories.) Recall that a monoidal category is a category D equipped with a bifunctor
and an object 1, satisfying associativity and unity equations up to coherent natural isomorphism,
A strong monoidal functor between two monoidal categories (E, · E , 1 E ) and (D, · D , 1 D ) is a functor F : E → D equipped with natural isomorphisms
which again satisfy associativity and unity conditions.
Definition 3.1.
A monoidal type refinement system is just a strong monoidal functor p : E → I.
As before, we can use type-theoretic language to elaborate on this compact definition. We will omit subscripts when referring to the respective monoidal structures on E and I, since there is never ambiguity in the way we use them. The object part of the strong monoidal functor p may be expressed as the following e-type formation rules,
while the arrow part can be expressed as the following typing rules:
The equations of monoidal categories may be expressed as the following equations on derivations:
• (associativity)
Definition 3.2. A monoidal (bi)fibration is a monoidal type refinement system p : E → I with all pullbacks (and pushforwards), such that the monoidal product on E preserves these pullbacks (and pushforwards).
The fact that p preserves all pullbacks and pushforwards may be expressed by saying that the canonical derivations
thereby witnessing the isomorphisms
We remark that this definition of monoidal fibration is essentially equivalent to the one appearing in [13] .
Monoidal closed type refinement systems
In this section we work out the definition of monoidal closed bifibrations-as a generalization of monoidal closed categories and a natural extension of the concept of bifibration-and describe some examples. These will include examples of monoidal closed bifibrations, of course, but also examples of logical structures that can be naturally defined inside monoidal closed bifibrations. Before we begin, though, it's worth spending a moment to discuss Lawvere's notion of hyperdoctrine [7] . There is obviously a very close kinship between the approach we have been describing here and the principles behind hyperdoctrines. What we call "i-types" correspond to what Lawvere just called "types", and what we call "e-types" correspond to what Lawvere called "attributes"; 2 pullback and pushforward correspond directly to "substitution" and "existential quantification". However, besides the obvious difference that we choose to work in a monoidal rather than a cartesian setting, the crucial difference is in the way that the closed structure on i-types is used, and the closed structure on e-types introduced.
In contrast to the situation with hyperdoctrines, monoidal closed type refinement systems follow a sort of microcosm principle [1] : in order to define what it means for e-types to have a closed structure, the category of i-types already has to be monoidal closed. And as we will see (Sections 4.4 and 5), the really interesting phenomena arise through the interaction of the two monoidal closed structures-typically by forming a product or residual of e-types, and then pushing forward or pulling back along a map defined using the monoidal closed structure of I.
Review of monoidal closed categories
Let A, B, and C be objects of a monoidal category. A left residual of C by A is an object 
Similarly, a right residual of C by B is an object we have
A monoidal closed category is a monoidal category equipped with left and right residuals for each pair of objects. We remark that the following maps are definable in any monoidal closed category (we will use them in Section 5) :
Note that the shift maps are the units of the continuation monads arising from adjunctions of the form
for each object C of a monoidal closed category I.
Residuals of e-types
Let p : E → I be a monoidal type refinement system over a monoidal closed category I. 
.2. Let T ⊏ B and U ⊏ C. A (p-)right residual of U by T is an e-type
equipped with a pair of admissible rules 
A monoidal closed (bi)fibration is a monoidal closed type refinement system which is also a monoidal (bi)fibration. 
Examples of monoidal closed bifibrations
3 NB: the formation rules for residuals sometimes appear strange at first to people familiar with the "rule of contravariant subtyping" for function types (and who thus expect something like A ⊏ S in the premise). This seems to be due to the long tradition of conflating the concepts of refinement and subtyping. For example, it is easy to show that for any collection of e-types
the following subtyping rules are admissible in a monoidal closed type refinement system:
and the residuals of e-types defined by 
and the residuals defined as sets of natural transformations
or equivalently as ends:
Example 4.7. The trivial bifibration C → 1 is of course also a trivial monoidal closed bifibration whenever C is a monoidal closed category.
Examples in monoidal closed bifibrations
The class of "Hoare logic bifibrations" of Example 2.23 are not typically considered as monoidal closed bifibrations. On the other hand, Reynolds and O'Hearn's separation logic [12] provides a nice example of a logical structure which can be naturally described internally to a monoidal closed bifibration. Suppose the category of i-types includes a monoid H of "heaps":
Heap assertions are modelled as different refinements of H. In particular, the "separating conjunction" and "magic wand" connectives on heap assertions may be defined as follows:
Interpreting this signature in the monoidal closed bifibration SubSet → Set gives the usual set-theoretic semantics of separation logic:
On the other hand, we can see that the internal definition is much more general. For example, interpreting the signature in SubCat → Cat recovers the Day construction for lifting a monoidal structure on a category to a monoidal closed structure on its category of presheaves:
The next proposition describes the situation more abstractly. 
satisfying the equations
Proof. We show how to build the rules:
The equations then follow from the equations of monoidal closed bifibrations, by a long but straightforward calculation. 
In fact, this adjunction is independent of whether the i-type H is an actual monoid (i.e., of whether the operations ⊛ and emp satisfy associativity and unit equations), and indeed it even extends to binary operations of arbitrary type. 
satisfying a three-way adjunction,
Representing monads
One of the original motivations for this study was to gain a better understanding of Andrzej Filinski's work on the representation of monadic effects in programming languages using continuations and state [2, 3] , and to place it in the wider context of universal algebra. To a first approximation, Filinski's representation of monads using continuations is very similar in spirit to the so-called codensity monad [5, 8] . The codensity monad of a functor R : D → E may be defined by the following end formula:
In the case that R has a left adjoint, then the codensity monad coincides with the monad induced by the adjunction, as a simple Yoneda-like calculation shows:
Thus, double-negation into a particular type subsumes double-negation into all pullbacks of that typeprovided we are in the context of a shift. After a few preliminaries, we will show how this idea leads to a general representation theorem for strong monads on monoidal closed fibrations.
Adjunctions and strong monads on type refinement systems
From now on we will consider pairs of type refinement systems
To avoid heavy notation, we will keep the same conventions for p and q as we had when there was just a single type refinement system (writing, for example, T ⊏ B for the refinement relation in q, rather than, say, T ⊏ q B). For clarity, though, we will distinguish the objects of D as "d-types", and the objects of J as "j-types", while continuing to refer to the objects of E and I as e-types and i-types. 
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The corresponding typing derivation mirrors the structure of the expression exactly, and the equations follow from the laws of strong monads. 
R[U]
is a pullback and
is a pullback, the left hand side
⊸ T must also be a pullback (Proposition 5.6).
